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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Act; it is to be hoped that its acceptance will soon be as universal as
that of the N.I.L.
JOHN W RICHARDS
PROPERTY
Alien Land Law. Chapters 9, 10 and 11 of the session laws are
amendments or additions to the Alien Land Law' Chapter 9 adds a
new section expressly granting the right to own or lease land in Wash-
ington to Canadian citizens of provinces which do not prohibit owner-
ship of land therein by Washington citizens, and to corporations
"organized under the laws of this or any other state" directly or
indirectly owned by such Canadians. Chapter 10 adds a proviso to
section 1 of the Alien Land Law withdrawing certain corporations from
the definition of "alien" by, apparently, establishing that the corporate
veil will be "pierced" only once to determine whether alien persons
are the real owners. This chapter also includes a severability clause and
a section 3 which repeals the section 2 of the corporation law comple-
mentary to the Alien Land Law2 Chapter 11 adds a sentence to assure
that exchange of stock of an "eligible" corporation for land transferred
by an "alien" corporation shall support a conclusion that the convey-
ance is in good faith and for value. It is complementary to Chapter 10.
It is this reviewer's recollection that newspaper accounts indicated
Chapter 9, which might be called the Canadian amendment, was moti-
vated by expressions in Canada that if Washington could not permit
citizens of the provinces north of the state to own land in the State
there might well be comparable restrictions running the other way;
and that Chapter 10 was believed to be necessary to assure location of
certain major corporate enterprises in Washington.
The immediate purposes of the sponsors of these changes probably
has been accomplished, but the combination of these changes, decisions
such as in the Sei Fujii and Kenji Namba cases, the federal consti-
tution, and the McCarran-Walter act' changing the naturalization laws,
as a practical matter makes the Alien Land Law essentially a dead
letter. At the time of the California and Oregon decisions, under the
federal law Japanese still could not qualify to become naturalized
1 RCW 64.16.
2 RCW 23.08.110 [RRS § 3836-16].
a See Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952).
4 Kenji Namba v. McCourt, 185 Ore. 579, 204 P.2d 569 (1949).
5 IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT, 66 STAT. 163 (1952), 8 USCA. § 1101
(1953 Supp.).
[AUGUST
WASHINGTON LEGISLATION-1953
United States citizens, and while an alien land law preventing all aliens
from land ownership might be valid, those decisions clearly indicate
that disqualification of Japanese aliens alone (or nearly alone) consti-
tuted an unconstitutional denial of equal protection.
Since the time of those decisions the federal statute has been amended
to provide, "The right of a person to become a naturalized citizen of
the United States shall not be denied or abridged because of, race or
sex or because such person is married."' All aliens rightfully perman-
ently residing in the United States are now, apparently, eligible for
citizenship, and the federal statute as amended preserves the declar-
ation of intention to become a citizen although such declaration is no
longer a procedural step to naturalization. It would seem, therefore,
that a resident alien after once in good faith declaring his intention
would be able to own land in Washington even though he never became
a citizen; and in any event the change in the federal statute eliminates
complications on resident's ownership under the Washington law
There is the possibility that non-resident aliens are now in certain
situations able to assert an uncQnstitutional discrimination from the
preference given by the Canadian amendment. There is the further
argument that the more favorable treatment accorded Canadian citizens
infringes upon exclusive federal power over foreign relations."
But even if the Alien Land Law is still good, and even if equal pro-
tection arguments are not persuasive, the double corporation ownership
possibility of Chapter 10 furnishes a relatively simple device to circum-
vent the restrictions of the Alien Land Law. The only requirement of
citizenship with reference to corporations appears to be that at least
two-thirds of the persons who are the incorporators must be citizens.
There is no requirement that the shareholders or directors be citizens.
Under Chapter 10 it appears that a corporation, owned -by aliens,
incorporated in Washington or some other state" could acquire owner-
ship of a second corporation, have the second corporation acquire
ownership of land in Washington and thereby have ownership in a
corporation not "alien" and therefore qualified. In effect, then, if the
aliens would set up two Washington corporations they could become
the beneficial and effective owners of land in the state.
0 IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY AcT § 311, 66 STAT. 239 (1952), 8 USCA. § 1422
(1953 Supp.).
7It should be pointed out, however, that the United States Supreme Court has not
accepted this argument where the problem presented was on the state's power over
devolution upon death. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
s Arguably, this includes alien as well as American states.
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Except for the fact that Section 33 of Article II of the Washington
Constitution proscribes alien land ownership9 it would have been
simpler and less confusing just to have repealed the whole Alien
Land Law
Survvorshp in Joint Tenancies. By chapter 270 the legislature has
completed the turn of the wheel on survivorship in joint tenancies and
although during the revolution a few spokes were knocked out, the
new law probably restores some which were at least weakened if not
broken by In Re Ivers' Estate0 and Holohan v. Melville" decided by
the Supreme Court in 1940, and 1952, respectively The essence of
the statute lies in the new first sentence: "The right of survivorship by
agreement or otherwise as a principle and as an incident of joint
tenancy or of tenancy by the entireties is abolished." Except for the
proviso and an emergency clause the statute repeats the language of
its predecessor enacted in 1885.
Until 1940 it was apparently generally assumed that the legislature
had abolished joint tenancy and its right of survivorship. But the
court by In re Ivers' Estate2 concluded that survivorship could exist
in a concurrent ownership of the bank account asset on the basis of
a contract or agreement therefor between husband and wife. In the
Holohan case"8 this reasoning was applied to a real property holding of
two spinster school teachers. Future creation of such interests would
appear clearly to be precluded now, but certain problems may still
arise; e.g., can a past attempt to create survivorship be effective when
the death of one occurs after the enactment? Before death to what
extent are inter vivos joint tenancy rules to be applied rather than
tenancy in common rules?
The spokes missing still are of three kinds under the proviso of
chapter 270" first, community property rights under, apparently, the
community property agreement statute;1" second, express statutory
survivorship situations, being the "bank account" statutes;" third,
as stated in the statute: "as to property and rights conveyed to
trustees while subject to the trust"-a provision which is entirely new
g The "Canadian" amendment to the Constitution was made in 1950.0 1n re Ivers' Estate, 4 Wn.2d 477, 104 P.2d 467 (1940).
11 Holohan v. Melville, 41 Wn.2d 380, 249 P2d 777 (1952).
12 Note 10 supra.
18 Note 11 supra.
14 RCW 26.16.120 [RRS §3164].
i5 Discussed n Rutledge, Joint Tenancy sn Washington Bank Accounts, 26 WASH.
L. REv. 116 (1951).
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Whether the second exception of the proviso poses problems in
ownership is open to dispute, but in any event this new law preserves
the effectiveness of prior statutory survivorship provisions.
Hmmy M. CRoss
SALES
Bulk Sales Law. Chapter 247 amends the present Bulk Sales Law.
It provides that the sworn statement of the vendor which is required
in case of a sale in bulk shall include, in addition to the list of creditors
and the amount due to each, the amount of unpaid taxes with respect
to the operation of the business of the vendor. This sworn statement
of the vendor shall contain an assertion that all such taxes have been
paid, or if unpaid, that the amount of taxes set forth is the correct
amount due according to the best knowledge of the vendor. The
statement is to be executed in triplicate rather than in duplicate as
before. The vendee must first apply the purchase price to the taxes
with respect to the operation of the business before the pro rata pay-
ment of claims of other creditors.'
Motor Vehicles. Several changes have been made in the acts relating
to the registration and licensing of motor vehicles. When a motor
vehicle is sold, the registered and legal owners, in addition to endorsing
an assignment on the back of the certificate of ownership, must also
record thereon the name of the purchaser and the date of the trans-
action.' The purchaser must now apply for the reissue of the certificate
of ownership within fifteen days after date of delivery of the vehicle to
him. If he fails to do this he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and
in addition he shall on making application for transfer be assessed a
five dollar penalty on the sixteenth day and one dollar additional for
each day thereafter, but not to exceed fifteen dollars.' Formerly the
purchaser was allowed thirty days to make application for transfer and
there was only a one dollar penalty for failure to comply.
Under the provisions of the new act, the application for a license
may not be filed before the first day of January of the calendar year
for which the license is to be issued, and a penalty of three dollars
will be assessed if an application for renewal is not filed before the
I L. 1953, c. 247, amending RCW 63.08.020, 63.08.030, 63.08.040 and 63.08.050
[Rem. Supp. 1943 § 5832 and RRS §5833].
2L. 1953, c. 252, §1, amending RCW 46.12.100 [Rem. Supp. 1947 §6312-6 (a)].
8L. 1953, c. 252, §2, amending RCW 46.12.110 [Rem. Supp. 1947 § 6312-6 (b)].
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